





































The past 15 years have witnessed an ever-growing interest in the role of implicit attitudes in mental and health-related problems and disorders. The purpose of the present paper is to provide an introduction to this research area. More specifically the following issues will be addressed: 1) Why do researchers consider implicit attitudes to be of interest? 2) In what way have researchers in the field of experimental psychopathology studied implicit attitudes? and 3) What has this research yielded so far? Rather than providing an exhaustive review, this last question is addressed by discussing some illustrative studies for several types of psychopathology. It is concluded that this is a promising field of research, but that a number of important questions remain unanswered. The paper is ended with a short discussion of possible directions for future research.
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Implicit Attitudes and Psychopathology
Aside from a healthy dose of luck a major prerequisite for survival is the ability to distinguish between objects, situations, and events that may be harmful or beneficial. To this purpose people constantly evaluate their environment. Such affective evaluations form the basis of our emotions, and are an important determinant of behavior and behavior modification (e.g., De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001). For instance, the loss of an object will only cause the emotional experience of anger or sadness if this object was evaluated as positive (Baeyens, 1998). 
Evaluative associations are also referred to as attitudes. An attitude can be defined as ‘an association between a given object and a given evaluative category’ (Fazio, Chen, McDonal, & Sherman, 1982; p. 341). Attitudes are assumed to perform an important approach-avoidance function (e.g., Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). There is general agreement that attitudes are summary statements, capturing attitude objects in evaluative dimensions like harmful – beneficial, dangerous – safe, or disgusting – appealing (e.g., Ajzen, 2001). When an object or situation activates a positive attitude, individuals are likely to primarily notice, attend and process its positive qualities, prompting approach behavior. If, on the other hand, a negative attitude is activated, attention and processing resources are most likely to be focused on the negative qualities of the object or situation, prompting avoidance behavior (Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999). As such, attitudes are important for the way we interact with our environment.
Meanwhile, it is well conceivable that certain learning experiences result in the formation of dysfunctional attitudes towards certain objects, situations or events that have adverse effects on daily functioning. Ultimately, certain dysfunctional attitudes may be involved in the onset and/or maintenance of psychological problems. For instance, cognitive models of anxiety pose that a biased interpretation of innocuous stimuli as threatening and dangerous is a core feature of anxiety disorders (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997). Following such models, anxiety disorders are the result of a dysfunctional association between anxiogenic stimuli and unrealistic negative attributes and consequences. Other examples of domains where dysfunctional attitudes are assumed to be important include depression (e.g., Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999), chronic pain complaints (e.g., Houben, Gijsen, Peterson, de Jong, & Vlaeyen, 2005), personality disorders (Arntz, Dreessen, Schouten, & Weertman, 2004), eating disorders (e.g., Roefs, Stapert, Isabella, Wolters, Wojciechowski, & Jansen, 2005), and addictive behaviors (e.g., Wiers & Stacy, 2006).
An important feature of attitudes is that, under certain conditions, the confrontation with an attitude object will automatically activate associations in memory (e.g., Fazio, 2001). Such automatically activated attitudes are often referred to as implicit attitudes. The evolutionary advantage of such a fast evaluative system is obvious: the quick recognition of an edible animal as harmless and a predator as dangerous may make all the difference between having a meal and becoming one. In a more general sense such a fast system has the major advantage of simple efficiency. It is not hard to imagine the disadvantages of having to strategically consider and contemplate the attributes of each object or situation we encounter. Conversely, implicit attitudes may also be dysfunctional, and even disruptive to an individual because they are, by definition, hard to control. For instance, negative implicit attitudes may trigger fear responses and avoidance behavior even when the individual knows the object or situation is in fact harmless. Positive implicit attitudes may lead to approach behaviors, even when the individual knows the object (or substance) is in fact harmful. For instance, in the context of smoking, dysfunctional automatic positive attitudes may explain why individuals continue to smoke cigarettes despite obvious health hazards, and why attempts to quit are often unsuccessful.
Why study dysfunctional implicit attitudes?
Research into the role of implicit attitudes in the onset and maintenance of psychopathology was inspired by the advent of a new class of measures. These measures are frequently referred to as implicit or indirect measures. It is important to note however, that there are a number of conceptual difficulties with the terms ‘implicit’ and ‘indirect’. For example, while the term ‘implicit measure’ is often used to imply that such a measure assesses unconscious attitudes or cognitions, it seems doubtful that participants are totally unaware of what is being measured (cf. Fazio & Olson, 2003). Furthermore, although there are some functional properties that are attributed to both ‘implicit measures’ as well as to ‘automatic processes’, the latter are traditionally used to refer to a much wider range of functional properties than the former (De Houwer, 2006). A discussion of the conceptual problems surrounding the terms ‘implicit’ and ‘indirect’ is beyond the scope of this paper, but interested readers are referred to a very clear chapter by De Houwer (2006). Suffice to say that in this article I use the term ‘implicit attitude’ to refer to a relatively automatically activated evaluative association in memory, and the term ‘indirect measure of implicit attitude’ to refer to a type of measurement instrument that is used to assess an implicit attitudes. 
Indirect measures of implicit attitudes were heralded as being able to provide a relatively unbiased index of individuals’ implicit attitudes, and as such seem promising for assessing the dysfunctional attitudes or beliefs that cognitive theorists assume to underlie psychological complaints. So far, individuals’ dysfunctional attitudes or beliefs were usually assessed by means of self-report instruments (e.g., Arntz, Lavy, van den Berg, & van Rijsoort 1993; Thorpe & Salkovskis, 1995; Vlaeyen, Geurts, Kole-Snijders, & Schuerman, 1990). Although such introspective self-reports may provide a unique insight in individuals’ subjective experience and have the advantage of being relatively cheap and easy to administer, they are limited by what a respondent is able and willing to accurately report (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). That is, pertinent dysfunctional attitudes may be hard to verbalize or unavailable to introspection (e.g., Greenwald, Banaji, Rudman, Farnham, Nosek, & Mellot, 2002; Mansell, 2000). In addition, some researchers have suggested that self-reported beliefs stem from representations that are relatively distinct from more indirectly assessed attitudes (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Wilson et al., 2000). Furthermore, self-reports are vulnerable to distortions, attribution bias and demand (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
Because of the limitations associated with self-report measures and their potential susceptibility to deception and self-presentational concerns, researchers in the field of experimental psychopathology have already used several performance-based measures to investigate dysfunctional cognitive processes. Examples are the modified Stroop, the lexical decision task, the dichotic listening task and several memory tasks (see Williams, Watts, McLeod, & Mathews, 1997). However, all these tasks provide indices of cognitive processing biases rather than dysfunctional attitudes or beliefs. Although biased information processing (e.g., attentional bias) is assumed to be functionally related to certain higher-order beliefs, measures of such biases do not provide an index of the beliefs themselves (Mansell, 2000). In addition, whereas dysfunctional beliefs can usually be traced back to specific associations between certain cues and dysfunctional attributes or consequences (e.g., palpitation – heart attack; self – worthless), paradigms like the Stroop predominantly measure privileged information processing of singular stimuli. In short, the results of such measurements provide rather indirect information concerning the content (and strength) of dysfunctional attitudes and beliefs.   
Indirect measures of implicit attitudes are particularly promising, as they seem to provide precisely such information. Most of these measures are reaction time tasks that require participants to sort target stimuli (words or pictures) as fast as possible using responses or response categories that are somehow associated with certain attributes. The idea behind all these paradigms is that participants will perform better (i.e., faster and/or more accurate) when the attribute properties of the required response are somehow associated with the target stimulus, than when they are not associated. Some examples of such paradigms will be described in the next section of this paper.
There are several features that make indirect measures of implicit attitudes very attractive for psychopathology research. First, being performance paradigms, they are not constrained by the limits of conscious introspection or verbalization. Second, because these tasks do not directly ask participants for a self-assessment of the attitude or cognition in question they seem to be less susceptible to deception and social desirability, and therefore are potentially more suitable for repeated assessments. Finally, these tasks aim to assess the extent to which (classes) of stimuli are automatically associated with certain attributes. The importance of differentiating between automatically activated and more deliberated attitudes has been emphasized in several information processing models. An important assumption of several of these models is that attitudes are automatically activated on presentation of an attitude object (Fazio, 2001; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Wilson et al., 2000). In addition, it is assumed that this automatically activated information can only be overridden (Wilson et al., 2000), changed (Fazio, 2001), or counteracted (Strack & Deutsch, 2004) by more deliberated attitudes or propositional beliefs if the individual is sufficiently motivated and has enough resources available. Following this, implicit attitudes are not merely faster and quieter versions of subsequent deliberate attitudes, but seem to stem from different representational formats. As such, indirect measures of implicit attitudes have the promise of yielding important additional information next to self-reports, when assessing the validity of the dominant cognitive models. 
Indirect measures of implicit attitudes
Over the past two decades a number of reaction time paradigms have been developed to indirectly assess implicit attitudes. Hereafter the basics will be described of the paradigms that have most frequently been used in the context of clinical and health psychology research.
Affective priming paradigm (APP)
The APP, developed by Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell and Kardes (1986), was the first reaction time paradigm developed to assess implicit attitudes. In this paradigm participants are presented with two stimuli in quick succession. The first stimulus is the prime, to which no response is required. After a short period, the prime is replaced by the second stimulus, the target. Participants are asked to evaluate this target stimulus as fast as possible as being positive or negative. The idea behind the APP is that when the valence of the prime is congruent with the valence of the target (e.g., ‘love’ – ‘happy’), participants will be faster to evaluate the target than when the valence of the prime-target pair is incongruent (i.e., ‘love’ – ‘awful’) (e.g., Fazio et al., 1986; Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2001). By comparing whether participants are faster naming the valence of positive or negative targets following a certain prime, the valence of the prime can be inferred. 
Implicit Association Test (IAT)
The IAT, developed by Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwarz (1998), is probably the most frequently used indirect measure of implicit attitudes. The IAT is a reaction time sorting task in which participants are instructed to sort stimuli into four different categories using two response keys. In a typical IAT, two of the categories represent so-called target concepts (e.g., flowers vs. insects), while the other two categories represent the poles of an attribute dimension (e.g. positive vs. negative). The IAT has two critical phases during which each response key is assigned to one of the target and one of the attribute categories. The two phases differ with respect to the target-attribute combinations that share the response keys. For example, in the first critical phase participants may be instructed to press the left response key for stimuli from the categories ‘flowers’ and ‘positive’ and the right response key for stimuli from the categories ‘insects’ and ‘negative’. Then, in the second critical phase, participants are instructed to press the left response key for stimuli from the categories ‘insects’ and ‘positive’ and the right response key for stimuli from the categories ‘flowers’ and ‘negative’. The idea behind the IAT is that participants will find it easier to sort the stimuli during a critical phase (i.e., will work faster and/or more accurate) when the target and attribute category that share a response key are associated in memory (compatible), than when they are not (incompatible). The difference in performance between the compatible and the incompatible phases is referred to as the IAT effect and interpreted as the strength of the implicit associations between the target and attribute categories (Greenwald et al., 1998). 
The IAT owes its’ popularity to the fact that it is easily adapted to suit diverse research topics, and shows relatively good internal consistency (e.g., Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000). Despite the popularity of the IAT, the task does have several drawbacks. One of these is that, inherent to its design, the IAT can only be used to assess relative attitudes for bipolar target concepts (e.g., self vs. others, men vs. women, etc.). This renders the task suboptimal for assessing unipolar concepts that have no immanent meaningful contrast, such as ‘smoking’ (e.g., Huijding & de Jong, 2006a) or ‘spiders’ (de Jong, van den Hout, Rietbroek, & Huijding, 2003). To overcome this limitation, Wigboldus, Holland, and van Knippenberg (2005) designed the so-called single target IAT (st-IAT). The st-IAT is structurally very similar to the IAT, but uses a single rather than two (bipolar) attribute categories. Other concerns that have been raised have to with the validity of the IAT as a measure of implicit attitudes (see De Houwer, 2002, for a detailed discussion). In an attempt to overcome such limitations researchers have been developing alternative indirect measures of implicit attitudes. 
Affective Simon Paradigm
Based on the spatial Simon task (e.g., Simon, 1990), De Houwer and Eelen (1998) introduced the Affective Simon Task (AST). The AST is a reaction time paradigm designed to capture the unintentional influence of the affective value of a stimulus on task performance. During critical phases participants are instructed to react as fast as possible with an affectively laden response depending on a non-evaluative feature of the stimulus. For instance, participants may be presented with positive and negative words that are written singular and plural format, and be instructed to say ‘positive’ in response to words in singular and ‘negative‘ in response to words in plural format. Responses are typically faster and more accurate when the valence of the stimulus and the response are congruent than when they are incongruent, even though stimulus valence is irrelevant for deciding the correct response. By comparing whether participants find it easier to give a positive or a negative response to a certain stimulus, the valence of this stimulus may be inferred. Note that the responses do not necessarily need to be verbal. Participants can also be asked to respond by moving a manikin, which is presented above or below the stimulus, as fast as possible toward or away from the stimulus depending on a non-evaluative feature of the stimulus (De Houwer, Crombez, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2001). Such implicit approach-avoidance tendencies are also assumed to reflect the affective value of the stimulus. 
As an alternative to the Simon paradigm that requires participants to react with an affectively laden response, De Houwer (2003) designed the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST). The EAST is structurally similar to the AST but instead of requiring responses that have a certain intrinsic valence (e.g., saying ‘positive’ or ‘negative’), participants are required to respond using keys that have acquired an extrinsic valence during an initial phase of the task. In his seminal experiment, De Houwer (2003) asked participants to sort stimulus words that were displayed in white as fast as possible on the basis of their valence using two response keys. All white words were clearly positively or negatively valenced. In a subsequent phase, stimulus words were presented that were sometimes displayed in green and sometimes in blue. Participants had to sort these words on the basis of their color, using the same response keys as before. In the critical phase, the white and colored words were presented intermixedly, and participants sorted the white words on the basis of their valence and the colored words on the basis of their color. The idea behind the EAST is that by pairing each response key consistently with either positive or negative white words, the keys acquire a positive or a negative valence. Thus, during the test phase participants sometimes have to press the positive and sometimes the negative key in response to a colored word. By presenting a word equally often in each color, it can be assessed whether participants find it easier to give a positive or a negative response to a certain stimulus, thus revealing the valence associated with the word (e.g., De Houwer, 2003). Note in passing that the EAST can be adapted to allow for the use of pictorial stimuli as well (e.g., Huijding & de Jong, in press a). 
The latest alternative is the identification EAST (ID-EAST) that was introduced recently by De Houwer and De Bruycker (in press). During this ID-EAST participants were presented with positive and negative attribute words and the words BEER and SPROUTS. All words were equally often written in upper and lower case letters. Participants were instructed to sort all words on the basis of their valence, with the exception of the words BEER and SPROUTS, these words has to be sorted on the basis of letter case. An important difference between the EAST and the ID-EAST is that the latter forces participants to process the meaning (and thereby the valence) of the target stimuli (see below).
Strengths and limitations
Researchers thus have a number of reaction time paradigms to their disposal that are designed to assess implicit attitudes. But what task is the best? This is a difficult question to answer as most of these tasks have strengths as well as limitations. For instance, although the APP seems a valid measure of implicit attitudes, research indicates that this task has a rather low internal consistency and reliability (cf. Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 2002; Bosson et al., 2000). The IAT on the other hand, has a much better internal consistency and thus seems quite reliable, but contends with some validity issues (see De Houwer, 2002). Meanwhile, when carefully constructed, the IAT does seem to assess implicit attitudes, and there is a wealth of research demonstrating that IAT scores are related to criterion behaviors. The major advantage of the EAST is that it does not suffer from some of the limitations associated with the IAT. At the same time studies that have employed the EAST report low internal consistencies. The pictorial version of the EAST, however, seems to provide somewhat more satisfactory results (Huijding & de Jong, 2005; 2006b). De Houwer recently argued that one reason for the low reliability of the EAST might be the fact that EAST-effects depend on the processing of a task-irrelevant stimulus feature, namely valence. This argument can be extended to AST and APP effects as well. Because there may be a number of factors that influence when and to what extent the valence of the target is actually processed, reliability of these tasks may be relatively easily compromised. For this reason the ID-EAST was introduced, that forces participants to process stimulus valence, and this task indeed seems to yield better results (De Houwer & De Bruycker, in press). Thus, there are pros and cons for each task, and in practice the choice of task depends on what a researcher wants to assess. However, there is one important limitation that holds for all indirect measures of implicit attitudes, and that researchers should be aware of. Indirect measures of implicit attitudes only allow for the inference that a certain stimulus A relatively automatically activates evaluative attribute B. The exact nature of the relation between A and B, for instance whether the association is conditional (if A then B) or unconditional (A = B), remains unclear (cf. de Jong, Pasman, Kindt, & van den Hout, 2001). 
Findings from psychopathology research
In the following section of this paper I will discuss some empirical findings concerning the role of dysfunctional implicit attitudes in various domains of psychopathology research. Without claiming to be exhaustive I will attempt to provide an overview of studies that have used indirect measures of implicit attitudes for studying a range of mental disorders and health-related problems.
Anxiety disorders
Cognitive models assume that anxiety disorders, including specific phobias, critically depend on dysfunctional cognitive structures (i.e., schemata) that guide information processing in a disorder-congruent manner (e.g., Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Williams et al., 1997). It has become clear that one important characteristic of anxiety is the involuntary prioritization of processing information that is relevant to current concerns (e.g., Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004). Importantly, the extent to which stimuli are relevant is likely to depend, at least partly, on how they are initially evaluated. As such, implicit attitudes can be conceptualized as reflecting (part of) the dysfunctional memory structures (or schemata) that are assumed to bias information processing. 
Spider fear. Research on the role of implicit attitudes in specific phobias has mainly concentrated on fear of spiders. The reasons for this focus are mostly pragmatic. Fear of spiders is relatively frequent in the general population, and individuals with spider phobia seldomly show comorbid psychiatric complaints. In addition, the object of fear is well-defined and relatively easy to acquire for research purposes. For these reasons fear of spiders is often used as a model for other types of fear. Over the years, research using several indirect measures has found evidence suggesting that implicit attitudes play a role in spider fear. A number of studies have found high spider fearful individuals to be characterized by implicit fear-related negative attitudes toward spiders (e.g., Huijding & de Jong, 2005; Teachman, Gregg, & Woody, 2001). For instance, Teachman and colleagues (2001) found that, relative to snake phobic individuals, spider phobic individuals categorized stimuli significantly faster during an IAT when ‘spiders’ and ‘bad’ shared one and ‘snake’ and ‘good’ the other response key, than when the response mappings were reversed (i.e., ‘spider’ + ‘good’, ‘snake’ + ‘bad’). Spider-related implicit attitudes also show incremental predictive power for overt avoidance behavior next to self-reported attitudes (Huijding & de Jong, 2005; Teachman & Woody, 2003). In addition, Ellwart and colleagues (2005) found support for the idea the activation of pertinent fear structures in memory influences the implicit evaluation of ambiguous stimuli. They assessed high and low spider fearful individuals’ implicit evaluations of ambiguous words after being primed with pictures of babies or pictures of spiders. The results showed that high fearful individuals evaluated the ambiguous words as significantly more negative than low fearful individuals after being primed with spiders, whereas the groups evaluated the words similarly after being primed with babies. Implicit spider-related attitudes have also been found to predict spontaneous fear responses over and above self-reported attitudes (Huijding & de Jong, 2006b). This supports the idea that indirect measures of implicit attitudes can provide additional information next to self-reports. Following the above-mentioned results, which suggest that implicit attitudes may play a role in spider fear, several studies have explored the clinically important question whether implicit attitudes change following treatment. Teachman and Woody (2003) found that implicit spider-disgust associations (as measured with an IAT) were significantly reduced following an exposure treatment. Importantly, however, this study did not include a high fearful treatment control group. A subsequent study by Huijding and de Jong (in press b), that also used the IAT and did include a high fearful control group, also found that harm and contamination-related attitudes were reduced following treatment. However, a similar reduction occurred in the control group that did not receive treatment. This seems to suggest that these results, as well as the findings of Teachman and Woody (2003) reflect test-retest rather than genuine treatment effects. An important implication is that the IAT may not be suited for repeated assessments. In a more recent study, Huijding and de Jong (2006c) used the EAST to assess the malleability of more general implicit attitudes with spiders over the course of a one-session exposure treatment. The pattern of results suggests that the EAST-scores were somewhat reduced following treatment (indicating less negative attitudes), but remained stable over a waiting period. Huijding and de Jong tentatively conclude that the EAST does not seem to suffer from test-retest effects. All in all, the findings in the context of spider fear show that implicit fear-related attitudes are certainly related to fear of spiders. However, it remains a question for future research whether this is a causal relationship. 
Social anxiety. To my knowledge, there are only three published studies that focused on implicit attitudes in the context of social anxiety. The first to assess implicit attitudes in social anxiety were de Jong and colleagues (2001), who asked high and low social fearful women to complete an IAT consisting of target words referring to social interactions (e.g., date, presentation) and neutral house-related words (e.g., kitchen, bedroom). The attribute words referred to possible positive and negative outcomes of social interactions (e.g., compliment or blunder). They found that the high anxious women performed better when the social anxious words shared the response key with negative outcomes than when they shared the response key with positive outcomes. The opposite pattern of results emerged for the low anxious women (de Jong et al., 2001). In a subsequent study, de Jong (2002) used a somewhat different approach assessing implicit attitudes toward the categories ‘self’ and ‘others’. He found that both high and low anxious individuals performed best when ‘self’ and ‘positive’ shared one and ‘other’ and ‘negative’ shared the other response key, than vice versa. However, this ‘positivity bias’ was significantly less strong for anxious individuals. More recently, Tanner, Stopa and De Houwer (in press) found a similar pattern of results in high and low anxious individuals following a social threat activation (giving a short speech). Importantly, this study controlled for depressive symptoms, ruling out the possibility that the difference between the two groups was caused by differences in depressive symptoms.
Thus, research has found no indication that implicit negative self-evaluations are involved in social anxiety. This renders it doubtful whether implicit attitudes toward the self are a crucial factor in the onset and/or maintenance of social phobia. Meanwhile, as positive self-esteem is considered to function as an important buffer against negative experiences, the lower implicit ‘self-positivity bias’ that was found in the above mentioned studies does open the possibility that implicit attitudes toward the self may play a more indirect role in social anxiety. 
Obsessive-compulsive disorder. The final anxiety disorder to be discussed here is obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). The only study conducted in this area is a recent study by Teachman, Woody and Magee (in press). Participants were instructed to identify unwanted intrusive thoughts from a list of commonly reported intrusive thoughts. Subsequently, individuals were informed that these thoughts were either 1) important and indicative of their personal values, 2) meaningless, or 3) no information was given. Following this manipulation Teachman and colleagues used an IAT to assess individuals’ implicit associations concerning the importance of unwanted thoughts, and their implicit associations between the self (me – not me) and dangerousness (dangerous – harmless) and the self and morality (moral – immoral). The results showed that all individuals associated the unwanted thoughts more strongly with important than with meaningless, but this effect was significantly stronger in the group that was told that unwanted thoughts are important. No group differences emerged with respect to the associations with the self. In addition, the implicit associations showed no direct relationship with other (self-report) measures of OCD beliefs. However, the more OCD symptoms individuals reported before the manipulation, the more the hearing that unwanted thoughts are important increased implicit self-dangerous associations. The manipulation had no effect on explicit (self-reported) self-judgments. On the basis of this single study it remains somewhat unclear whether dysfunctional implicit associations are truly an important factor in OCD. Meanwhile, the results do suggest that some (albeit perhaps indirect) relation exists, and this should be investigated further in future research.
Depression
There is considerable evidence that individuals usually possess a so-called ‘positivety bias’, viewing the self in a positive way (e.g., Greenwald et al., 2002). According to cognitive models of depression (e.g., Clark et al., 1999), depressed individuals, instead, show a negative bias toward the self. Negative self-related schemata are assumed to play an important role in the maintenance of depression (Williams, 1997). Importantly, these schemata are considered to be automatically activated and escape logic reasoning. As such, indirect measures seem well suited to assess the dysfunctional self-related implicit attitudes that may underlie these schemata. These attitudes are usually referred to as implicit self-esteem.
In a first attempt to assess implicit self-esteem in the context of depression, Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, and Kennedy (2001) used an IAT consisting of the target categories ‘me’ and ‘not me’, and positive and negative attributes. Formerly depressed and never depressed individuals completed this IAT before and after a negative mood induction. A close inspection of the data shows some unexpected results (note that the authors present the data somewhat differently). First, both groups displayed relatively positive implicit self-esteem before and after the mood induction. Second, before the mood induction the formerly depressed individuals showed more positive implicit self-esteem than never depressed individuals, whereas no group differences remained after the mood induction. Third, the authors report that the implicit self-esteem of the formerly depressed after treatment was similar to that of a group of depressed individuals. Taken together these findings suggest that, contrary to cognitive theory, neither formerly nor currently depressed individuals are characterized by negative implicit self-related attitudes. In an attempt to verify these unexpected results, De Raedt, Franck, Schacht, and De Houwer (in press) assessed implicit-self-esteem in currently depressed participants and healthy controls using several paradigms including the IAT and the EAST. They found the depressed and the control group to show a similarly strong positivity bias on the IAT. On the EAST the depressed individuals even showed a significantly stronger positivity bias than the healthy controls. In an attempt to explain these results, De Raedt et al. (in press) point to research suggesting that measures of implicit self-esteem may reflect the early-developed self, whereas explicit, deliberated attitudes reflect the self-view related to more recent experiences. Another explanation they draw attention to follows from research that suggests that not so much positive or negative self-esteem, but rather an inconsistent self-esteem seems to be involved in depression. That is, high implicit self-esteem in combination with low explicit self-esteem may be particularly problematic. In a subsequent study Franck, De Raedt, Dereu, and Van den Abbeele (2006) tested this possibility by asking a group of depressed individuals with suicidal ideation, without suicidal ideation and a healthy control group to complete a self-esteem IAT. The distinction between depressed individuals with and without suicidal ideation was made because suicidal ideation may be related to inconsistent self-esteem. Individuals with suicidal ideation showed a similarly positive implicit self-esteem as the healthy controls, whereas the depressed individuals without suicidal ideation showed neutral or ambivalent implicit self-esteem. In addition, and as expected, the discrepancy between implicit and explicit (i.e., self-reported) self-esteem was highest in the group of depressed individuals with suicidal ideation, whereas the other groups did not differ. These findings lead to the interesting suggestion that the discrepancy between implicit positive attitudes (stemming from early childhood) and explicit negative attitudes (based on more recent experiences) may cause an individual to feel entrapped. As a result, the individual may be compelled to consider suicide as a way of coping.
Taken together, these studies show that, contrary to what was expected on the basis of cognitive theories, depressed individuals are not characterized by implicit negative attitudes toward the self. Rather, the studies suggest that the interaction between implicit and explicit self-esteem may be an important factor in (the severity of) depression. Clearly however, more research is needed to clarify this relationship.
Addictive behaviors
Similar to cognitive conceptualizations of emotional disorders, recent models of addictive behaviors propose that the prioritization of disorder-salient information may be the core process underlying compulsive drug use and craving (Lubman, Peters, & Mogg, 2000). It has been suggested for smoking and drinking that one of the reasons why individuals continue with their habits in spite of the negative consequences is because of implicit positive attitudes toward relevant cues. Thus, implicit positive attitudes may function as a relatively uncontrollable motivator for continued (ab)use.
Smoking. In apparent contrast to the idea that positive implicit attitudes are important in smoking, a series of IAT studies consistently found smokers to respond faster when smoking stimuli were paired with negative attributes than with positive attributes (De Houwer, Custers, & De Clerq, in press, Experiment 1; Huijding, de Jong, Wiers, & Verkooijen, 2005, Experiment 1; Sherman, Presson, Chassin, Rose, & Koch, 2003, Experiment 1; Swanson, Rudman, & Greenwald, 2001, Experiment 3). These findings led some researchers to conclude that apparently global positive attitudes are no factor driving smoking behaviors (Huijding et al., 2005). However, there are alternative explanations for these negative findings. For instance, some of the findings may reflect a negative cultural connotation rather than personal attitudes toward smoking. This idea seems to be indirectly supported by several studies. A recent study by De Houwer and colleagues (in press), in which a personalized IAT (Olson & Fazio, 2004) was used, smokers were found to be significantly faster when smoking was paired with positive rather than with negative attributes. The important difference with previously used IATs is that this IAT is argued to be more sensitive to personal rather than culturally endorsed attitudes. Another alternative explanation is that the measurement context did not allow for positive smoking attitudes to emerge. Indeed, there is evidence that the outcomes of indirect measures like the IAT are very context dependent (e.g., Blair, 2002, for a review). In line with this alternative explanation, Sherman and colleagues (2003) found, using the APP, that smokers showed positive attitudes towards the sensory aspects of smoking, but negative attitudes towards packaging information that included a health warning. Huijding and de Jong (2006a) also found smokers to endorse positive attitudes toward smoking on a st-IAT containing pictorial stimuli of smoking that focused on the sensory aspects of smoking. Taken together, it thus seems premature to conclude that 1) smokers’ implicit smoking attitudes are negative, and 2) implicit attitudes are no driving factor in smoking behaviors.
Drinking. A series of IAT studies into drinking attitudes seem to suggest that heavy drinkers endorse negative attitudes toward alcohol (De Houwer, Crombez, Koster, & De Beul, 2004; de Jong, Wiers, van de Braak, & Huijding, in press; Wiers, van Woerden, Smulders, & de Jong, 2002; Wiers, van de Luitgaarden, van den Wildenberg, & Smulders, 2005). One possible explanation for this unexpected finding is that the IAT effects do not reflect the intended target-attribute associations, but rather depend on the relative salience of the target and attribute pairs that were used (see Rothermund & Wentura, 2004). However, a recent study found no evidence to support this hypothesis (Houben & Wiers, 2006, Experiment 2). Meanwhile, there are findings that suggest that drinkers may have ambivalent rather than exclusively negative implicit attitudes with drinking. Jajodia and Earleywine (2003) used two ‘unipolar’ IATs, in which the attribute categories were ‘positive’ and ‘neutral’ in one and ‘negative’ and ‘neutral’ in the other IAT. The target categories were ‘alcohol’ and ‘mammals’ in both IATs. The results showed positive alcohol IAT effects emerged on the positive IAT and negative IAT effects emerged on the negative IAT. Similar findings were reported by Houben and Wiers (2006, Experiment 1), who showed that the negative results that are found with bipolar IATs may at least be party due to the particular IAT procedure that is used. In line with this, two studies that used the EAST to assess heavy drinkers implicit attitudes with alcoholic drinks, found neutral or ambivalent rather than negative implicit attitudes toward alcoholic drinks (De Houwer et al., 2004; de Jong et al., in press). Finally, in a recent study De Houwer and De Bruycker (in press) found heavy drinkers to show positive implicit attitudes toward beer. Importantly, several studies have shown that implicit drinking attitudes are related to (problem) drinking (De Houwer & De Bruycker in press; de Jong et al., in press; Houben & Wiers, 2006; Wiers et al., 2002).
Research in the context of alcohol has also focussed on implicit attitudes with respect to a second affective dimension next to valence, namely arousal-sedation. Heavy drinkers (Wiers et al., 2002; Wiers et al., 2005) as well as individuals who were being treated for alcohol abuse (De Houwer et al., 2004) have been found to show strong alcohol-arousal associations. Wiers et al. (2002) have argued, referring to the incentive-sensitization theory of Robinson and Berridge (2003), that alcohol-arousal associations may be linked to a sensitised brain system that is involved in the “wanting” (i.e., incentive salience), but not the “liking” (hedonic value) of alcohol. 
Thus, in the context of alcohol it seems that drinkers may have ambivalent implicit attitudes toward alcohol, and that these attitudes are related to drinking behavior. In addition, next to valence-related attitudes also aurousal-related attitudes seem to play a role in (problematic) drinking behaviors. It is important to note however that as yet it remains an empirical question whether implicit drinking attitudes and drinking/problems are causally related. 
Eating disorders
Intuitively one would expect that what is considered appetitive will depend on how it is (initially) evaluated. In the context of eating behaviors, indirect measures of implicit attitudes have therefore been used to test the hypothesis that implicit positive evaluation of food items is involved in overeating. Such an implicit preference for fat food would be hard to continuously inhibit, leading to bad eating habits, overeating and/or binges. On the other hand, anorexia nervosa patients may show reduced, or an absence of, positive implicit attitudes toward palatable food items (e.g., Roefs, 2004).
In a series of studies Roefs and colleagues found no differences between either high and low restraint eaters (Roefs, Herman, Macleod, Smulders, & Jansen, 2005), and obese and low restraint eaters (Roefs, Stapert, et al., 2005; Roefs et al., in press) with respect to their affective attitudes toward food. One study did find a difference between obese people and normal weight controls, but unexpectedly the obese participants showed a more negative implicit attitude toward high-fat foods than the normal weight controls  (Roefs & Jansen, 2002). In a discussion of these results, the researchers already pointed out that this pattern of results was probably due to features of the IAT. Roefs (2004) eventually concluded that in the context of adult obesity there are no differences between normal and obese individuals with respect to their initial implicit evaluation of food. Interestingly, Craeynest, Crombez, De Houwer, Deforche, Tanghe, and De Bourdeaudhuij (2005) found, using an EAST, that children were generally faster pressing the positive key than the negative key in response to food stimuli. This effect was stronger in obese than in normal weight children. This suggests that obese children may like all kinds of food better. Although this finding in a sample of children seems to contradict the findings reported by Roefs and colleagues, they may also reflect different stages in the development of obesity. Similar to what has been proposed for addictive substances, it has been suggested that food ‘wanting’ may be an important factor next to food ‘liking’. The idea is that as an addiction develops liking becomes less important, whereas wanting becomes the most important factor in the maintenance of continued substance (ab)use. Germane to this suggestion, obese children and restrained eaters have been found to be more impulsive than lean controls (e.g., Nederkoorn, Van Eijs, & Jansen, 2004). Perhaps the greater liking of food as a child, together with being relatively impulsive (which in turn may require more effort to restrain oneself from eating), may initially lead to overeating and obesity. While the wanting of food and related craving increases over time, global affective attitudes toward eating may become less and less positive.
With respect to undereaters (i.e., anorexia nervosa patients) it has been shown that in extreme undereating a lack of affective responses to food may be involved (Roefs, Stapert, et al., 2005). However, as yet this is the only published study available on this topic and several questions remain. For instance, is the affective responsiveness of anorexia patients truly extinguished or do positive or negative attitudes toward certain aspects of food remain? Relatedly, the lack of implicit affective responses could also be due to a general anhedonia rather than a specific extinguished appetitive response to food.
Discussion and future research
Reviewing evidence from different fields of research shows that whereas implicit attitudes seem to be directly related to some disorders (e.g., spider fear), their role may be more indirect, and possibly shifting over the course of development, in others (e.g., eating disorders). Exploring these differences across various disorders is an important way of increasing our understanding of the factors that may be involved in these types of psychopathology. Knowing whether a pertinent attitude is activated automatically or not is theoretically important in it self, but may also make a difference in selecting the treatment of choice. For instance, exposure therapy seems particularly effective for disorders that involve relatively uncontrollable (fear) responses, whereas disorders in which more conscious deliberations (or ruminations) are important may be more efficiently treated using an intervention that challenges higher order beliefs. 
Meanwhile, a lot of questions remain to be answered, and several issues urgently need attention. Possibly one of the most important issues concerns the reliability and validity of indirect measures of implicit attitudes. While research has shown that the psychometric properties of most of these measures need to be further improved, they are nevertheless used more and more often. Therefore, researchers should remain critical as to what exactly a measure assesses and whether this is in line with the intentions of the researcher. As long as the psychometric qualities of the indirect measures that we use are either unsatisfactory or unknown, it remains difficult to evaluate the value of research findings that are based on these measures.
With respect to the role that implicit attitudes may play in psychopathology the major question facing researchers is that of causality. Although the number of studies that have demonstrated some kind of relationship between a disorder and dysfunctional implicit attitudes steadily increases, it remains unclear whether these attitudes are causal factors in the onset and maintenance of the disorder, or merely epiphenomena. Therefore, future prognostic studies should test the predictive validity of implicit attitudes in the etiology and return of complaints, as well as examine the clinical relevance of including indirect measures of implicit attitudes. To more definitely answer the question of causality, however, it will be necessary to specifically manipulate implicit attitudes and assess subsequent changes on relevant outcome measures. Most important for the question of causality in the context of the maintenance of a disorder would be to unlearn the dysfunctional attitude, and test whether such a correction yields a subsequent drop in symptoms. One way of changing implicit attitudes could be by using evaluative conditioning procedures. Baccus, Baldwin and Packer (2004) recently showed that an evaluative conditioning task, in the form of a computer game, was successful in specifically enhancing implicit positive attitudes toward the self (i.e., implicit self-esteem). It would be a small step to use such an approach to examine the effects of experimentally manipulated implicit self-esteem on anxious behavior, for instance during a stressful speech. A similar approach could be adopted to examine the causal role of implicit attitudes in other types of disorders. Alternatively, but more relevant to the question of whether implicit attitudes are involved in the onset of a disorder, one could learn participants’ specific attitudes, and then test the emergence of specific symptoms. Obviously, however, such research would be difficult to realize due to ethical concerns. 
A final avenue for further research follows from the idea that not only an understanding of dysfunctional attitudes in the patient but also in the therapist may be important for tailoring and improving effective interventions. That is, dysfunctional implicit attitudes in the therapist may unintentionally promote ineffective or even counterproductive interventions. In a first exploration of this intriguing issue, Houben and colleagues (2005) assessed implicit and self-reported evaluations of certain movements in physiotherapy students who had almost completed their studies. In particular, participants’ implicit evaluations of certain physical movements in terms of threat-value were assessed. They found that the implicit evaluations of the movements had independent predictive validity for treatment advice. Importantly, the implicit and more deliberated evaluations of the movements as harmful showed a minimal correlation. This suggests that the incorrect automatic evaluation of a movement as harmful (or harmless) guides treatment advice, independent of whether the individual explicitly knows the movement is actually harmless (or harmful). It is conceivable that similar effects can adversely influence treatments for a range of disorders. For instance, Teachman, Gapinski, Brownell, Rawlins, and Jeyaram (2003) found evidence for a strong anti-fat bias in the general public. Such a bias could undermine treatment effects in weight control training programs. For these reasons, it is important for future research to further explore the impact of dysfunctional implicit attitudes on the part of the therapist on treatment effects. 
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